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NOTES AND COMMENT
THE NEW YORK ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT AS AFFECTING THE
CLOSE-CORPORATION.
Piercing the Corporate Veil.
The New York Court of Appeals was recently confronted with
a novel case 1 involving the doctrine of "Piercing the Corporate Veil",2
the complexities being intensified in applying the New York Anti-
Injunction Statute.3 Four brothers aiid their mother, the only direc-
tors, officers and stockholders of the plaintiff corporation, had em-
ployed members of the defendant union. On the expiration of the
contract and a failure to negotiate for a renewal, the union sought to
compel the plaintiff to hire their men by picketing and other methods.
An injunction was applied for on general equitable grounds against
the defendant's interference with its business, concededly not having
complied with the provisions of the Civil Practice Act, Section 876-a.4
The plaintiff contended that the corporate entity should be ignored,
as it conducted only a small family business, the stockholders per-
forming almost all the manual labor without any employees. The
Court of Appeals, in a divided opinion,5 held, that an employer-
employee relationship existed between the corporate employer and its
stockholders, refused to "penetrate the veil" and decided the contro-
versy constituted a "labor dispute" 6 within the meaning of the stat-
ute. The dissent, however, maintained this was a case wherein jus-
tice demanded the "corporate personality" be ignored. In voting for
the injunction on equitable grounds, reality, not theory, was looked
upon as the controlling factor. The majority of the court claimed the
union was not self-contradictory in insisting on the existence of an
employer-employee relationship and refusing to admit the stockhold-
ers to membership as being employers. This is anomalous as the
1 Boro Park Poultry Market, Inc. v. Heller, 280 N. Y. 481, 21 N. E. (2d)
687 (1939).
2 Note (1937) 11 ST. JOHN'S L. Rv. 294.
3 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 876-a (N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 477).
4 LIEN, LABOR LAW AND RELATIONS (1938) § 217. The complaint should
allege: (1) facts giving the court jurisdiction; (2) unlawful acts, i.e., unlawful
picketing, false and fraudulent dissemination of information to the public, vio-
lence, crime, property damage, or injury to the person; (3) defendant's liability
for participating, authorizing or ratifying the acts; (4) threats of unlawful
acts or their continuance; (5) facts showing substantial and irreparable injury,
with the balance of the equities in the plaintiff's favor; (6) public officers have
failed or refused to give adequate protection; (7) reasonable efforts have been
made to settle the dispute by negotiation or voluntary arbitration; (8) plaintiff
has complied with all the provisions of the act; (9) the legal remedy is inade-
quate.
GThe majority of the court was composed of Justices Lehman, Crane,
Loughran and Finch, while Justices Hubbs and Rippey dissented, Justice O'Brien
taking no part.
6 N. Y. Civ. PPAc. AcT § 876-a(10) (c).
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individuals on the one hand are regarded as the "bosses", while on
the other the corporation is considered their employer.
The perplexing problem is under what circumstances one should
consider the corporation as a distinct entity, 7 and when it may be justly
disregarded. The corporate entity must be looked upon as a legal per-
sonality for ordinary everyday transactions, i.e., acquiring and trans-
ferring property, making contracts, suing and being sued, etc. This
concept has been attacked 8 on the ground that it becomes idolized and
so deep-rooted as to prohibit any contradiction, with a consequent re-
fusal to go behind the actual facts. A court of law often has a figura-
tive concept which takes the shape of dogma and is rigorously upheld
despite the purpose of the corporation.9 Equity, on the other hand,
determines the rights and liabilities of the real parties in interest, its
elastic procedure permitting the recognition of the true relationship
between the corporation and its stockholders when necessary for an
equitable result.' 0 There the association is treated as a collection of
7 Most authorities characterize the corporate entity as an artificial fiction.
Sutton's Hospital, 10 Coke's Rep. 1, 32, 77 Eng. Rep. 937, 972 (1613) ("A cor-
poration aggregate of many is invisible, immortal, and rests only in intendment
and consideration of the law") ; Blackstone (1 BL. Comm. *467) refers to cor-
porations as "artificial persons"; Bank v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61, 87 (U. S.
1809) C" * * * that invisible, intangible and artificial being; that mere legal
entity"); Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 636
(U. S. 1819) (" * * * artificial being, invisible, intangible and existing only in
contemplation of law") ; People v. North River Sugar Refining Co., 121 N. Y.
582, 621, 24 N. E. 834, 839 (1890) ("The abstract idea of a corporation, the
legal entity, the impalpable and intangible creation of human thought, is itself
a figure of speech. It serves very well to designate in our minds the collective
action and agency of many individuals as permitted by our laws") ; 7 R. C. L.
(1915) p. 25, §3; 14 C. J. (1919) p. 52, §5; 13 Am. JUR. (1938) p. 157, §6;
Professor Radin (Radin, The ETndless Problem of Corporate Personality (1932)
32 COL. L. REv. 643) conceives of a corporation as a deliberate assumption of
something which it is not, a definite and unconcealed make-believe, which the
law treats as if human.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Pierson, 130 Misc. 110, 114, 22 N. Y. Supp.
532, 538 (1927) ("A continental school * * * insists that a corporation has
something akin to human personality, with a corporate will, additional to and
identifiable from the separate wills of the corporators. * * * The tendency with
us has been to accept what is commonly called the 'fiction', perhaps sometimes
the 'concession theory', of the corporation"); Arthur W. Machen (Machen,
Corporate Personality (1911) 24 HARV. L. Rev. 253) contends that it is a real,
natural thing, not imaginary, fictional or artificial, recognized and not created by
law as an entity, an objective fact.
8 Wormser, Piercing the Veil of Corporate Entity (1912) 12 COL. L
REv. 496.
9 1 MORAWETZ, PRNfATE CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1896) p. 222, § 227. The
instant case would seem to justify this conclusion. The theory tends to produce
an absoluteness of. thought. which determines the matter for all cases, totally
disregarding whether the statement fulfills the purpose for which it was intended.
The error lies in the fact that the same reasoning is applied to situations essen-
tially different, though all involve the corporate issue, and similar terminology
is adopted. Latty, The Corporate Entity as a Solvent of Legal Problems
(1936) 34 Micyr. L. REv. 597.0 Note (1937) 11 ST. JOHN'S L. Rev. 294. One should bear in mind,
however, that there are and must be limitations to casting aside the form. It
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individuals who, in reality, own its property 1 and conduct its busi-
ness for their individual benefit, as in the instant case'where no third
party is concerned.
It must be borne in mind that the law is growing, changing with
the times, especially in the field of corporations, and that any defini-
tion must of necessity be relative, not absolute.12 The peculiar facts
in the particular case determine whether the "corporate veil" should
be "pierced". A broad foundation of the doctrine is the basis of the
determination, rather than any limitation to a specific class of cases
or particular subject matter or to the parties' relative position. The
dissimilarities produce a different workability of the concept, the cor-
poration presenting divergent aspects for various situations. Often
it must be viewed as a composite unit, the entity dominating, while
under other circumstances the members' existence is the primary fac-
should not be capriciously nor inconsistently disregarded without due considera-
tion for fundamental rules of law. McCaskill Co. v. United States, 216 U. S.
504, 30 Sup. Ct. 386 (1910); Smith v. Moore, 199 Fed. 689 (C. C. A. 9th,
1912) ; United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 234 Fed. 127 (D. C. E. D.
Mo. 1916); Phoenix Inv. Co. v. James, 228 Ariz. 514, 237 Pac. 958 (1925);
Ark. River, etc. Co. v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 13 Colo. 587, 22 Pac. 954(1889) ; Chicago Union Traction Co. v. City of Chicago, 199 Ill. 579, 65 N. E.
470 (1902); Goss & Co. v. Goss, 147 App. Div. 698, 132 N. Y. Supp. 76, aff'd,
207 N. Y. 742, 101 N. E. 1099 (1913); Chas. F. Garrigues Co. v. Int'l Agr.
Corp., 159 App. Div. 877, 144 N. Y. Supp. 982 (1st Dept. 1913); Cawthra v.
Stewart, 59 Misc. 38, 109 N. Y. Supp. 770 (1908).
Professor Ballantine believes that strict adherence should be the rule and
the courts should not disregard it when reasonable limitations are made to
effectuate the proper ends and functions of the corporate privilege. By ignoring
the concept one is merely left at the threshold of the determination of the
question of ultimate liability. BALLANTINE, CogrOP'AooNs (1927) § 6. The
theory is rendered less certain and definite, breeding vagueness and confusion,
making more difficult a topic subject to much controversy. By introducing new
elements into litigations, valuable corporate features are lost, which, after all,
were the purposes of incorporation originally. Again, what are to be the
applicable standards and where should the line of demarcation be set? Canfield,
The Scope and Limits of the Corporate Entity Theory (1917) 17 COL. L. REv.
128; (1918) 31 HARV. L. Rlv. 894. In many cases the fiction should not and
has not been disregarded where they have been cited for that proposition, as the
decision may often be reached on more satisfactory grounds. Note (1937) 11
ST. JOHN's L. REv. 294.
11 In re Winburn's Will, 136 Misc. 19, 21, 240 N. Y. Supp. 208, 209 (1930)("However, in construing similar provisions in wills, courts in this state have
regarded the substance of the gift and have pierced the veil of corporate entity
to sustain such a gift. Matter of Foley, 132 Misc. 332, 230 N. Y. Supp. 305(1928). The recent cases have shown an impatience with the strict 'entity
doctrine', and have been disposed to disregard the corporate fiction, especially in
cases of so-called 'one-man companies', where these have been used simply for
convenience. In such cases the courts have frequently tended to 'pierce the veil
of corporate entity' and to treat the title as really being in the sole stockholder.
There is a strong intimation in judge Crane's opinion in the Brown case that
the court is not in entire sympathy with the doctrine of corporate entity where
it tends to cloud and shroud the actual facts") ; In re Turley's Estate, 160 Misc.
190, 289 N. Y. Supp. 704 (1936).
12 Latty, The Corporate Entity as a Solvent of Legal Problems (1936) 34
MicH. L. REv. 597.
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tor, the fiction being a mere convenient symbol.' 3 To promote jus-
tice and avert wrong, the instant case must be allocated to the latter
theory. No third party is involved, as the union itself admits the
stockholders are the employers by refusing to accept their member-
ship, despite the fact that they later contend the corporation occupies
such a position. In reality, the union is picketing the members, as
individuals, to compel their employing union labor. The corporate
form itself is inconsequential, and the defendant's dispute is restricted
to the individuals who will finally determine whether or not they will
accede to the demands imposed on them. Although the very nature
of the corporate fiction is that it should be acted upon as if true,
14 it
must never be invoked to an extent not within reason and public
policy. The fiction is applied only in the sense that the law treats a
group of persons as though it was an individual.' 5 Here it seems is
the "proper case" 16 where the equities are balanced in the plaintiff's
favor and the corporate fiction should be disregarded. This appears
especially true when, as seen subsequently,17 the corporation was
forced to dissolve a few days after the decision in the instant case,
13 Halsted v. Globe Indemnity Co., 258 N. Y. 176, 179, 179 N. E. 376, 377(1932) ("The corporation exists for the legitimate convenience of the stock-
holders; not as a mere mask for their personal acts and responsibilities. It
absorbs and takes the place of the individuals who own its stock) ; Werner v.
Hearst, 177 N. Y. 63, 69 N. E. 221 (1903); Brock v. Poor, 216 N. Y. 387,
111 N. E. 229 (1915); Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 244 N. Y. 84, 155 N. E. 58
(1926); Jenkins v. Moyse, 254 N. Y. 319, 172 N. E. 521 (1930); 1 MORAWETZ,
op. cit. supra note 9, at § 1; (1924) 24 CoL L. REv. 798.
Among the distinctive and advantageous features of incorporation are:
(1) limited liability; (2) creation by the acceptance of its certificate of incor-
poration by the Secretary of State; (3) the capacity to sue and be sued in its
own name; (4) "continuous succession", i.e., neither death, insanity nor bank-
ruptcy of any stockholder has any effect on the legal existence of the entity;
(5) management by a board of directors; (6) transferability of stock certifi-
cates. PRASHxER, LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (1937) 92.
14 Klein v. Board of Supervisors, 230 Ky. 182, 18 S. W. (2d) 1009, aff'd,
282 U. S. 19, 51 Sup. Ct. 15 (1930).
15 State v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio St. 137, 30 N. E. 279 (1892);
Damascus Mfg. Co. v. Union Trust Co., 119 Ohio St. 439, 164 N. E. 530
(1929); CLARK, CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1916) p. 2, § 3. A fiction should only
be used to promote justice and may be contradicted for any purpose but to
defeat the ends for which it was created. Johnson v. Smith, 2 Burr. 950, 97
Eng. Rep. 647 (1760).
16Note (1937) 11 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 294; WoRMsER, THE DISREGARD OF
THE CORPORATE FicTioN (1927) 84 ("The nearest approximation to generaliza-
tion which the present state of the authorities would warrant is this: When the
conception of the corporate entity is employed to defraud creditors, to evade an
existing obligation, to circumvent a statute, to achieve or perpetuate monopoly,
or to protect knavery or crime, the courts will draw aside the web of entity,
will regard the corporate company as an association of live, up-and-doing, men
and women shareholders, and will do justice between real persons. This is
particularly true in courts of equity, but finds many illustrations in courts of
law as well * * * ").
17 Kershner v. Heller, 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 595, inod'd, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 451
(2d Dept. 1939) (to determine by jury trial whether the plaintiff's partnership
is bona fide as a question of fact).
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forming a partnership and obtaining an injunction against the de-
fendant's picketing.
The New York Anti-Injunction Act.
a. Public Policy.
It has become quite common for several individuals to picket a
place of business, attempting to persuade the public to side with them
in their struggle with an employer to force him to comply with their
demands for higher wages, less hours, better conditions, a closed shop
and other vital interests of labor. Placards are exhibited describing
the "unfair treatment" they have suffered. When, through violence,
coercion and intimidation, the situation gets out of hand, the public
authorities are called.18  Injunctive relief is the only method left for
the employer to combat the union carrying on its various modes of
economic warfare. 9 A temporary injunction, as applied in a labor
dispute, is a provisional remedy procured by the plaintiff at the com-
mencement of the action or during its progress to immediately secure
him against irreparable loss and injury. Its purpose is to effectuate
the final judgment, if obtained, by restraining the defendant, pending
the action, from the commission of acts which would preclude ulti-
mate adequate relief, if permitted. The status quo is thus maintained
until the final determination of the issues. 20
The Sherman Anti-Trust Act 21 well illustrates the previous at-
titude toward the labor union which had been subject to innumerable
injunctions, by declaring it to constitute a monopoly. By 1914, how-
ever, there was a shift of view. The Clayton Act 22 exempted the
union from its provisions, and what seemed more of a victory for
labor was Section 20,23 which restricted the issuance of labor injunc-
18 Heintz Mfg. Co. v. Local No. 515 of U. A. W., 20 F. Supp. 116 (D. C.
E. D. Pa. 1937) ("That act of Congress [Norris-LaGuardia Act] was based
upon a recognition of the fact that the preservation of order and the protection
of property in labor disputes is in the first instance a police problem, belonging
to the executive rather than the judicial side of the government, and its whole
intent and purpose was to remove the courts from that field, except in cases
where the peace authorities failed or refused to act").
19 2 WAIT, PRACTICE AT LAW, EQUITY (3d ed. 1935) p. 395, § 12.
20 7 CARMODY, PLEADING AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1932) p. 205, § 180. Peace-
ful picketing will not be enjoined until an unlawful act is imminent or something
has occurred to start in motion the administration of equitable rules or the per-
formance of police duties. Senn v. Tile Layers Union, 222 Wis. 383, 268 N. W.
270, aff'd, 301 U. S. 468, 57 Sup. Ct. 857 (1937).2126 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. §§ 1-7; (1934) LIEN, loc. cit. supra
note 4; Legis. (1939) 14 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 200.
22 CLAYTON AT § 6, 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 17 (1934).
23 CLAYTON ACT §20, 38 STAT. 738 (1914), 29 U. S. C. § 52 (1934) ("That
no restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of the United
States * * * in any case between an employer and employees, or between employers
and employees, or between employees, or between persons employed and persons
seeking employment, involving, or growing out of, a dispute concerning terms
or conditions of employment, unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury to
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tions. The courts, in at least two cases, 24 held, by a narrow con-
struction, that those not proximately and substantially concerned as
parties to an actual labor dispute involving terms or conditions of
employment could be enjoined, i.e., only a distinct employer-employee
relationship militated against an injunction. The Norris-LaGuardia
Anti-Injunction Act was passed by Congress to obviate this con-
struction 25 and to remedy the situation as expressed in the New York
Civil Practice Act,26 one of many state statutes substantially similar
to it. The compelling conclusion to be derived from the cases 27 is
that Congress intended that many acts, heretofore illegal, were now
to be considered lawful. As was pointedly remarked: 28  "But that
section (Civil Practice Act Section 876a) tellingly indicates the pol-
icy of this state concerning injunctions in labor disputes. Since its
enactment and the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, many of
the old precedents have become outmoded. They mark a new era
in the domain of labor injunctions. More and more the tendency is
to permit the parties to compose their differences without resort to
injunction. The old order was injunction first, the new is injunction
property or to a property right, of the party making the application, for which
injury there is no adequate remedy at law, and such property or property right
must be described with particularity in the application * * * ").24 Duplex Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 447, 41 Sup. Ct. 172 (1921) ; American
Foundries v. Tri-City Council, 257 U. S. 184, 42 Sup. Ct. 73 (1921).
25 Senn v. Tile Layers Union, 301 U. S. 468, 57 Sup. Ct. 857 (1937) ; Lauf
v. E. G. Shinner, 303 U. S. 323, 58 Sup. Ct. 578 (1937); New Negro Alliance
v. Grocery Co., 303 U. S. 552, 58 Sup. Ct. 703 (1938) ; (1938) 13 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 171.
26 N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 477, § 1: "The policy of this state is declared as
follows: Equity procedure that permits a complaining party to obtain sweeping
injunctive relief that is not preceded by or conditioned upon adequate notice and
hearing of the responding party or parties, or that issues after a hearing based
upon written affidavits alone and not upon examination, confrontation and
cross-examination of witnesses in open court, is peculiarly subject to abuses in
labor litigations for the reason that among other things,
(1) The status quo cannot be maintained but is necessarily altered by the
injunction,
(2) Determination of issues of veracity and of probability of fact from
affidavits of opposing parties that are contradicted, and under the circumstances,
untrustworthy rather than from oral examination in open court is subject to
grave error,
(3) Error in issuing the injunctive relief is usually irreparable to the
opposing party, and
(4) Delay incident to the normal course of appellate practice frequently
makes ultimate correction of error in law or in fact unavailing in the particular
case"; (1937) 37 COL. L. Rav. 1411.
27 Schuster v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, etc., 293 Ill. App. 177, 12 N. E.
(2d) 50 (1938); Geo. B. Wallace Co. v. Int'l Ass'n, M. M. H. L., 155 Ore.
652, 63 P. (2d) 1090 (1936). Both express the view that it is reasonably
certain that the state legislature had the same intent as Congress, the statute in
each case being substantially similar to the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
28 Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 159 Misc. 806, 813, 288 N. Y. Supp. 855, 863
(1936), rev'd, 250 App. Div. 751, 295 N. Y. Supp. 753, tnod'd, 276 N. Y. 281,
11 N. E. (2d) 910 (1937); (1938) 12 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 358.
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last." The express policy of Congress 29 considered the then prevail-
ing economic conditions. The Government had aided in organizing
property owners into associations, and had left the unorganized
worker helpless to protect his freedom of labor in contracting for ac-
ceptable terms and conditions of employment. Independence in asso-
ciation, self-organization, and designation of representatives of the
worker's own choice to negotiate terms of employment was declared
necessary, as was the desire to be bereft of interference, restraint, or
coercion of employers in any concerted activity or collective bargain-
ing or other mutual aid or protection.
b. "Labor Dispute."
The Anti-Injunction Acts have been held to limit equity's prior
exercised jurisdiction, and have not conferred it anew.30 In accor-
dance with the express statutory conditions precedent for immunity
from an injunction in a labor dispute,3' courts will only grant one in
their discretion,32 depending on some extraordinary facts involved in
the particular case. The term "labor dispute" 33 has been given a
broad, liberal construction,3 4 comprehending a great variety of situa-
tions not necessarily concerning a dispute between an employer and
employee, nor the existence of the proximate relationship between
them. As Justice Frankfurter said,35 "A strike or threat to strike
29 47 STAT. §§ 70-73 (1932), 29 U. S. C. §§ 101-111 (1934) ; United States
v. Weirton Steel Co., 10 F. Supp. 55 (D. C. D. Del. 1935); Oberman & Co. v.
United Garment Workers of America, 21 F. Supp. 20 (D. C. W. D. Mo. 1937).
The social advantage of peaceful picketing is the desire to improve the worker's
economic status which is best accomplished by collective bargaining. Note
(1937) 23 CoRNy. L. Q. 206.30 Virginia Ry. Co. v. System Federation etc., 11 F. Supp. 621, aff'd, 84 F.
(2d) 641, aft'd, 300 U. S. 515, 57 Sup. Ct. 592 (1937) ; Cinderella Theatre Co.
v. Sign Writers Local Union, 6 F. Supp. 164 (D. C. E. D. Mich. 1934); Notes
(1923) 27 A. L. R. 411; (1925) 35 A. L. R. 460; (1935) 97 A. L. R. 1334;
(1937) 106 A. L. R. 362; (1939) 120 A. L. R. 316. This series of annotations
contains an excellent survey of all the related aspects of these statutes not
considered in this note.3 1 N ote (1936) 14 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 89.32 PRASHKER, CASES AND MATRIS ON THE LAW OF NEW YORK PLEADING
AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1937) 1062. The acts are unique in that no injunction,
temporary or permanent, in a "labor dispute" will be granted until after a hear-
ing, in which a verified complaint and bill of particulars is served, an opportunity
has been given for cross-examination of witnesses, affidavits being inadmissible
in evidence. The finding of the facts by the court is mandatory, otherwise the
granting of an injunction is without jurisdiction.33 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 876-a(10) (c).
34 United Electric Coal Cos. Co v. Rice, 80 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938),
cert. denied, 297 U. S. 714, 56 Sup. Ct. 590 (1936) ; Oberman & Co. v. United
Garment Workers of America, 21 F. Supp. 20 (D. C. W. D. Mo. 1937) ; Weil
& Co. v. Doe, 168 Misc. 211, 5 N. Y. S. (2d) 559 (1938) ; see the dissenting
opinion of Justice Lehman in Busch Jewelry Co. v. United Retail Employees'
Union, 281 N. Y. 150, 22 N. E. (2d) 320 (1930); (1938) 15 N. Y. U. L. Q.
REv. 581; (1938) 38 COL. L. Rev. 1265.35 FRANKFURTER AND GREEN, LABOR INJUNcTiONS 45.
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may be brought to bear on neutrals, provided that the neutrals thus
used as a lever are within the same industry as those in whose co-
ercion the union is primarily interested." It is essential that there
be a controversy involving some term or condition of employment,
i.e., recognition of representatives, strike for a closed shop, or a union-
ization campaign, etc., and not necessarily concerning wages and
hours.3
6
The leading case 3 7 on the point and which the instant case cites
with approval, decided that "Where the owner of a small business
without any employees seeks to avoid 'labor disputes' as defined in
the statute, by running his business without any employees, an at-
tempt to induce or coerce him to hire an employee or employees, upon
terms and conditions satisfactory to persons associated in such at-
tempted inducements or coercion, is not a 'labor dispute' within the
letter or spirit of the statutory definition. We hold that the statute has
no application in this case." The cases 38 reveal, as in the case under
discussion, that the applicant is a small business owner, aided by his
family and an employee whom he is forced to discharge as a result
of a demand upon him to accept a contract to iaintain the union
wage, which he cannot afford. Thereafter, only he and his family per-
form all the work of the business and he is beset by picketing.
Whether peaceful or otherwise,3 9 it should be enjoined, as not being
3 See note 30, supra.
37 Thompson v. Boekhout, 273 N. Y. 390, 393, 7 N. E. (2d) 674, 675 (1937).
38 Luft v. Flove, 246 App. Div. 523, 283 N. Y. Supp. 481, aff'd, 270 N. Y.
640, 1 N. E. (2d) 369 (1936) (The defendant was permitted to apply for an
order vacating a permanent injunction in the event the plaintiff employs others
than his wife and two sons in his place of business) ; Kershner v. Heller, 14
N. Y. S. (2d) 595, inod'd, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 451 (2d Dept. 1939) (To deter-
mine by jury trial whether the plaintiff's partnership is bona fide as a question
of fact. The employer-employee relationship necessary to prohibit an injunc-
tion did not exist under the same facts as in the instant case, the partners con-
ducting their business alone) ; Bieber v. Bininbaum, 168 Misc. 943, 6 N. Y. S.
(2d) 63 (1938) (No "labor dispute" is involved where a small business owner
discharged his only salesman after refusing to accede to the union's demand to
sign a contract) ; Botnich v. Winokur, 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 6 (1938) (The statute
would be inapplicable if the plaintiff ran his business without employees, but
would apply otherwise) ; Pitter v. Kaminsky, 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 10 (1938) (It is
the business owner's right to conduct his business without outside aid, and he
may not be subjected to picketing by a union to induce him to hire union
employees); Wishney v. Jones, 169 Misc. 459, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 2 (1938) (No
"labor dispute" existed within the definition of the statute, the plaintiff not
employing any workers and definitely manifesting a desire to liquidate his busi-
ness) ; Gips v. Osman, 170 Misc. 53, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 828 (1938) (The statute
refers to a "labor dispute" of which there could be none if no one was
employed). Compare Miller v. Fishworkers Union, 170 Misc. 713, 11 N. Y. S.
(2d) 278 (1939) (Co-partners secured an injunction against the union, after
'the sole employee was discharged) with Schwartz v. Fishworkers Union, 170
Misc. 566, 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 285 (1939).
39 Legis. (1939) 14 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 200 contains an excellent survey of
picketing in New York, in which is discussed the law of picketing accompanied
by fraud, violence, or other illegality, and peaceful picketing as involved in
"labor disputes" and "non-labor disputes".
[ VOL. 14
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within the Legislature's contemplation to compel one to employ union
workers against his will when he desires to run his business without
outside assistance.
Conclusion.
It is therefore submitted that the court in the instant case should
not have bound itself to a strict view of a corporate form. Rather it
should have considered the stockholders as primarily important, and
ignored the corporate entity. As thus contemplated, the five mem-
bers of the family are the sole owners and workers, not involved in
a "labor dispute" within the meaning of the Anti-Injunction Act, and
are entitled to an injunction without complying with its terms on the
equities balanced in their favor.
BERNARD ROTHMAN.
